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Original Research Article
Emotional artificial intelligence in
children’s toys and devices: Ethics,
governance and practical remedies
Andrew McStay1 and Gilad Rosner2
Abstract
This article examines the social acceptability and governance of emotional artificial intelligence (emotional AI) in child-
ren’s toys and other child-oriented devices. To explore this, it conducts interviews with stakeholders with a professional
interest in emotional AI, toys, children and policy to consider implications of the usage of emotional AI in children’s toys
and services. It also conducts a demographically representative UK national survey to ascertain parental perspectives on
networked toys that utilise data about emotions. The article highlights disquiet about the evolution of generational
unfairness, that encompasses injustices regarding the datafication of childhood, manipulation, parental vulnerability,
synthetic personalities, child and parental media literacy, and need for improved governance. It concludes with practical
recommendations for regulators and the toy industry.
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Introduction
Against the context of increasing datafication of chil-
dren (Lupton and Williamson, 2017) and surveillance
capitalism (Zuboff, 2019), this article investigates child-
ren’s toys and services that make use of emotional AI.
Although smart and connected toys are growing in
popularity (Mascheroni and Holloway, 2019), avail-
ability and use of emotoys are few and limited in
scope. Yet, on the basis of rising interest in the use of
emotional AI and biosensing across diverse life
domains (McStay, 2018), growth in networked objects,
and the long history of toys and care (Turkle, 2011), it
is likely that emotion and affect-based entanglement
between children, networked objects and AI-based
playthings is picking up speed. While we are sensitive
to debates around the psychology of childhood devel-
opment, this is not our expertise. Rather, we are inter-
ested in arising ethical and governance concerns, the
terms by which child emotional AI may be acceptable
(if any) and what parents think of these technologies.
To explore these issues we conducted interviews with
data protection regulators, leading academics, privacy-
oriented non-governmental organisations (NGOs), and
diverse industrial and service sectors that use emotional
AI. Against a context of literature on dataveillance and
children, connected and smart toys, emotional AI and
criticism of affective computing, the leading theme to
emerge from interviewee concerns is generational
unfairness. In digitally mediated life the term has
roots in ‘sharenting’ and exploitation of children’s dig-
ital footprints (Blum-Ross and Livingstone, 2017). Yet,
injustices against children are evolving to encompasses
biometric privacy, novel modes of datafied commerci-
alisation of childhood, and the social installing of ques-
tionable relationships between children and synthetic
personalities. We followed our interviews with a UK-
wide national survey of parental attitudes towards
emotoys. This explored the acceptability of emotoys
and use of emotional AI in child-focused technologies,
and by what terms use of these intimate technologies in
toys should be governed. It revealed ambivalent atti-
tudes and, when interpreted in context of literature on
technology, ethics and parenting, highlights a need to
protect parents as well as children.
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Emotional AI in children’s toys and
services
Emotional AI refers to technologies that use affective
computing and artificial intelligence techniques to try
to sense, learn about, and interact with human emo-
tional life (Emotional AI Lab, 2020). The practice of
using computer sensing to interact with emotional life
has origins in the 1990s, with the field of affective com-
puting (Picard, 1997).What McStay (2018) terms ‘emo-
tional AI’ and ‘empathic media’ are made possible
through weak, narrow and task-based AI efforts to
see, read, listen, feel, classify and learn about emotional
life. This involves data about words, images, facial
expressions, gaze direction, gestures, voices and the
body, which itself encompasses heart rate, body tem-
perature, respiration and electrical properties of skin.
Applied to children, emotional AI raises concern
about the conversion of child behaviour and subjectiv-
ity into biocapital (Lupton and Williamson, 2017).
Questions about child bodies and profiling sit within
a context of longstanding concern about media effects
on children, online screen-based media, and the
increased tendency for children to be ‘always on’ in
all contexts of childhood (such as play, communica-
tion, education and promotion of wellbeing;
Livingstone et al., 2018). Leaver’s (2017) work on
parents is also relevant to this article, questioning the
positioning of datafied surveillance as a normalised
part of childcare where not using intimate surveillance
may be seen as a failure of parenting (see also Stark
and Levy, 2018). Here the emotional and affective con-
text that parenting takes place in increasingly overlaps
with the datafication of parenting (in Leaver’s case,
pregnancy apps and sensors in cots and cribs).
Emotion focused wearables are increasing in popularity
with Amazon’s Halo and Garmin systems already
tracking emotion. Child-specific wearables are emerg-
ing too, such as Moxo, by the start-up mPath, who
have worked with brands including LEGO, Google,
Best Buy and Hasbro.
On toys, despite the seeming novelty of emotional
AI in toys, there is a historical context. Toys with robo-
qualities of automata reach back to the 1800s and
beyond. For example, in the 1920s, Dolly Rekord,
designed by Madame Hendren, was a phonograph
doll that spoke nursery rhymes. In 1959, Mattel’s
Chatty Cathy was able to utter 11 phrases, including
“I love you” (Vlahos, 2019). Dolls such as Talky Crissy
from the 1970s contained transistors and circuit boards
that played pre-recorded electronic messages (McStay
and Rosner, 2020). By the 1980s microprocessors gave
rise to interactive toys such as Teddy Ruxpin that read
children stories.
The 1990s saw a new development. Whereas toys in
the past were typically Rorschach objects, upon which
a child projects feelings and situations, ‘smart toys’
involved new forms of mutual engagement that
involved awareness of the toy’s emotional state
(Turkle, 2011). Raising questions about human–techni-
cal connection and care for semi-autonomous systems,
‘toys’ such as Tiger Electronics’ Furby (1998) and
Bandai’s Tamagotchi (1996) created novel forms of
entanglement with machines. Despite the relative sim-
plicity of these social technologies, they introduced
tricky questions about the desirability of care for
objects, hybridity, biomimetic toys, anthropomorphism
and the need to keep synthetic entities ‘happy’. The
2010s saw the emergence of ‘connected toys’ that rely
on the internet, Wi-Fi and Bluetooth and ‘smart toys’
defined by sensors, voice and/or image recognition
software, self-learning algorithms, scope for interaction
with children and the creation of relatively easy-to-use
control software (Holloway and Green, 2016; Winfield,
2012). These smart and connected toys raised security
concerns (Chaudron et al., 2019), but also apprehen-
sion of deception in child relationships with AI systems
(Jones and Meurer, 2016). Other smart and connected
toys scholars have examined the lack of creativity
afforded by smart toys and how their designs may be
transgressed by children (Grimes, 2015, Marsh, 2017),
adult conceptions of what a child is (Ruckenstein,
2010), comparisons between real and robo-pets (Ribi
et al., 2008), domestication of toys (Brito et al., 2019),
and the blurring of shifting online and offline domains
(Mascheroni and Holloway, 2019).
Emotoys themselves are still relatively rare although
home social robots, such as Anki’s Cozmo (2016) make
use of existing optical and voice-based sensors (Druga
et al., 2017). With a chirpy voice, Cozmo has social
qualities in that ‘he’ (gendered male by its creators)
learns, adapts, responds to users and has ‘moods’ of
his own. Mood degrades if he gets ‘hungry,’ he shows
‘elation’ and ‘confidence’ at having won a game, lows if
it strays close to an edge from which he can fall, and
even ‘anger’, such as Cozmo smashing his forklift into
the ground if he fails at a task. Able to recognise users,
he reads facial expressions and (in a limited fashion)
interprets his environment. Through cameras, Cozmo’s
facial recognition software allows him to recognise
faces and learn people’s names, but he also uses emo-
tional AI to recognise and respond to basic emotions:
anger, disgust, fear, happiness, sadness, and surprise.
In time emotoys are likely to possess additional sen-
sors, including players’ heart rate, skin conductivity
and blood flow sensors (McStay and Rosner, 2020).
We suggest however that developments in both emo-
toys and wider child emo-objects will not be driven
solely by technology, but the extent to which
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technology engenders care, entanglement with objects,
experience, learning and novel ways of mediating
human relationships.
Research design
To understand ethical questions around emotoys and
parental perspectives we conducted 13 in-depth inter-
views (Miller and Crabtree, 1992) and a demographi-
cally representative UK national survey of parental
attitudes to emotional AI in child-focused technologies
(n¼ 1000). The interviews were designed to uncover
legal, child development, privacy and consumer-
related issues for further consideration. Their aim was
to solicit opinion and insight from individuals across
industry, academic, policy, health and civil society
groups in the UK and USA with expertise on emotion-
al AI, data ethics regarding children’s emotions, rele-
vant legal issues and the toy industry. With informed
consent, the interviews were conducted between August
2019 and May 2020, with an average interview
length of an hour. Questions were tailored towards
interviewees’ expertise, and each (with varying degrees
of follow-up questioning) were asked about the future
of emotoys, technology, rules and ethics, potential
harms and benefits. Interviewees were happy to be
identified and speak of their own views, but noted
that these views should not be taken as representative
of their organisations (See Table 1 for interviews).
Thematic analysis of interviews
Due to familiarity with the topic of emotional AI
(McStay, 2018) and Internet of Things (IoT) data pro-
tection policy (Rosner and Kenneally, 2018), analysis
of the 13 interview transcripts followed an adaptive
approach (Layder, 1998). This balances deductive
theory with inductive insights from data. To analyse
the interview data, a hand-coded approach was
employed (Cresswell, 1994; Miles et al., 2014). This
was preferred to a software-led approach due to low
interviewee numbers, sensitivity to the context of the
interviews, voice and behaviour cues, and other contex-
tual factors that might have been missed by an auto-
mated approach. The practicalities of coding were done
by annotating sentences and paragraphs of deductive
interest (from the literature review and author under-
standing of the field) and inductive interest (other
insights relevant to the research aims of this project
that were not foreseen). After developing codes, these
were abstracted into categories and then into broader
themes. Both authors undertook this process, reached
similar conclusions, and then debated and agreed four
key themes. These are generational unfairness; parental
susceptibility; guarded interest in potential benefits of
these technologies; and need for good governance.
Survey design
To explore issues arising from analysis of the interview
data, we sought insights from parents regarding: (1)
acceptability of emotoys and use of emotional AI in
child-focused technologies; and (2) by what terms use
of these intimate technologies in toys should be gov-
erned. Conducted in the UK in February 2020 and
executed online via commercial survey organisation,
ICM Unlimited, the survey (n¼ 1000) was segmented
by UK region, work status, parental age and gender
(binary). Parents were also segmented by the age of
their children. The survey asked about parents’ com-
fort with monitoring child emotion through toys;
acceptability of wearables that report affective/emo-
tional states to parents; usefulness of these insights;
whether data should be shared with authorities in
cases of abuse/self-harm; when consent should be
given for emotoys services; and comfort with data
Table 1. Interviewees asked about emotoys.
Name Organisation
Amelia Vance Future of Privacy Forum (NGO)
Stephen Balkam Family Online Safety Institute (NGO)
Josh Golin Campaign for Commercial Free Childhood (NGO)
Ben Bland Sensum (Industry)
Jag Minhas Sensing-Feeling (Industry)
Pamela Pavliscak ChangeSciences (Industry)
Damian Clifford Legal specialist in emotional AI (Academic)
Eva Lievens Toy researcher and child rights specialist (Academic)
Ingrida Milkaite Toy researcher and child rights specialist (Academic)
Sandra Leaton Gray Specialist in education biometrics (Academic)
Sonia Livingstone LSE (Academic/Policy)
Jenny Radesky Paediatrician/Research clinician (Health)
Valerie Verdoodt LSE (Academic/Policy)
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collection of emotions for child marketing. Online sur-
veys are imperfect, involving difficulty of presenting
complex topics, inter-subjectivity and minimal control
over whether respondents are engaged or distracted
(Rog and Bickman, 2009). Yet, positively, the research
generated a respectable weighted sample of hard-
to-reach participants. Further, absence of inter-
subjective sensitivities also avoided interviewer bias, a
common problem with ethical and privacy-related
research (Zureik and Stalker, 2010).
Key findings
The interviews generated four key themes: (1) genera-
tional unfairness, with sub-themes on manipulation,
memory, and living with ontologically uncertain objects;
(2) susceptibility of parents, with a sub-theme on imma-
ture signals; (3) guarded interest; and (4) need for good
governance, with sub-themes on special protections for
emotion data, timing and consent. Each of these are
discussed below.
Generational unfairness
The principle of generational unfairness is not new,
given unconsented to sharing of photos of children by
parents on social media (Leaver, 2017), attribution of
digital skills to children, consequent burden of respon-
sibility (Livingstone and Third, 2017), and longstand-
ing introduction of smart objects into the home
(Chaudron et al., 2019). The unfairness is that children
have little control over the datafication of their child-
hood years. Yet, we suggest that data about emotion
represents an increase in this logic, introducing new
concerns and questions. Thus, generational unfairness
was an expected, but important, insight from our inter-
views and thematic analysis. Josh Golin of Campaign
for Commercial Free Childhood crystallises this view,
saying:
When your own play in your own bedroom is no longer
private, when your own home is no longer private,
when your own feelings and emotions are no longer
yours to share when you choose to share them, but
are being analysed and shared with others even when
you’re not ready to share them – I think we’ve done
those kids a tremendous disservice [. . .]. (Interview,
2019)
Stephen Balkam (of the US-based Family Online
Safety Institute) also raised the issue of fairness in
that adults (parents, industry and public sector) are
collecting and processing children’s data without
always thinking about future impacts. Balkam notes
the absence of brakes on generational unfairness
highlighting that, ‘We’re [society at large] making this
up as we go along’ and that:
I have concerns there will be emotional tracking of
children throughout their adulthood, and that it
starts to become available to the university that
they’re applying to, or the healthcare that they would
like to obtain, or the job that they’re after. (Interview,
2019)
There has been longstanding concern about ‘share-
nting’ and children’s digital footprints (Blum-Ross
and Livingstone, 2017), but Balkam’s points illustrate
how emotoys and related affect-sensitive objects
advance critical understanding of generational unfair-
ness. This was echoed by Sandra Gray (University
College London and My Life Online project), who
observes, ‘I don’t think they [children] understand
quite how much of a bloated data identity they all
have, and what the consequences down the line are.
But then, why would you expect them to, when most
adults don’t properly understand that?’ (Interview,
2019).
Emotional AI amplifies informational asymmetry
due to child inability to challenge embedded framings
of emotion in technology. For example Jag Minhas, of
emotional AI company Sensing-Feeling, contrasts this
with adults who have scope to negotiate with emotional
AI technologies: such as deciding not to use a given
device, to switch off emotion-sensing functionality, or
to conceptually challenge the limited palette of emo-
tions offered by emotional AI. If data literacy for chil-
dren refers to ‘the knowledge, skills and attitudes that
allow children to flourish and thrive in an increasingly
global digital world’ (Nascimbeni and Vosloo, 2019: 3),
the challenge of understanding and disputing how emo-
tions are categorised sets what we see as an impossible
literacy benchmark, certainly for young children. This
leads to a potentially insidious outcome, as Minhas
concludes by suggesting that we might ‘breed a gener-
ation of people who have a very confined set of per-
sonalities that were influenced heavily by algorithms.’
Manipulation. Key among unfairness concerns was
manipulation by companies that do not have child
wellbeing foremost in mind, economic value of data
about emotion, and power differentials. Industry
expert Ben Bland (Sensum) remarked that ‘if anyone
[in the emotion analytics industry] is focusing their
research on children as a data set, they’re going to
have a huge advantage in the market if they’re going
to start creating toys and things off the back of it’. On
manipulation and third parties, Bland notes this data
would be a premium product and that negative emo-
tion would be most valuable because ‘people spend
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more when depressed’. Indeed, studies of social media
companies show that they have long profiled the full
gamut of child emotions and profited as a result
(Barassi, 2020). For Jenny Radesky (Developmental
Behavioural Paediatrician with a focus on digital
media) emotional AI used with children creates gener-
ational unfairness through power imbalances between
companies and children, largely due to children’s ‘lim-
ited awareness about their own emotions . . . about data
collection and about machine learning and all of the
other technical aspects that go into their interactions
with technology . . .’ (Interview, 2019). Interviewees rec-
ognised the ease with which these technologies might be
woven into a dystopian narrative, but were broadly
keen to avoid this. Amelia Vance (Director of Youth
and Education Privacy at the Future of Privacy
Forum) for example saw scope for positive uses of
child nudging, but also stated that technologies that
influence emotions ‘are pushing past nudging to out-
right manipulation’, which in turn creates a ‘discrepan-
cy of power between the companies offering a
convenience, and people adopting it without under-
standing the implications’ (Interview, 2019).
Memory: Data longevity and the right to a past. Another
aspect of generational unfairness is concern about the
right to have parts of childhood forgotten. With pre-
existing concern in ‘sharenting’ (Blum-Ross and
Livingstone, 2017) and right to data erasure debates
(Lambert, 2019), emotoys expand concerns about
data longevity. For example, Golin observes that
increasing toys’ capacity for conversational ability
means that children would ‘tend to see them as confi-
dants and confide in them’ (Interview, 2019). This is a
reasonable assertion given human–computer interface
research on Amazon’s Alexa that finds ‘young children
are highly influenced by the spoken nature of conver-
sational agents, respond to the agents at a very young
age, and imbue the agent with human-like qualities’
(Sciuto et al., 2018: 866). For Golin confidence is prob-
lematic because, in the case of Hello Barbie, ‘Mattel
employees were going to be listening to these conversa-
tions; that they were going to be shared with third
parties, but it wasn’t exactly clear who these third par-
ties were going to be [. . .]’ (Interview, 2019). Problems
with data longevity in emotion-sensing toys and related
objects were exacerbated through potential for discrim-
ination. Golin notes for example that suggestions
coming from emotion-enabled devices on how to a
calm a child may, in the short term, be useful informa-
tion, but adds that ‘the idea that that information
would live on as a profile . . . that that child might be
labelled as being “prone to tantrums,” there’s just so
many ways that that’s troubling’ (Interview, 2019).
Amplifying Leaver’s (2017) concerns about intimate
surveillance in social media, apps and smart objects, it
is instructive to recollect that toys such as Barbie and
counterpart Ken are a way for children to safely
explore, enjoy and try-for-size adult concepts like sex-
uality (McDonough, 2011). Asked about the need to
retain personal data to enhance toy development and
user experience, Golin insists that retention is genera-
tionally unfair, asserting that ‘It doesn’t benefit the
child or the parent at all that they’re keeping a record-
ing of this.’ Radesky also raises generational and tem-
poral concerns, and privacy arguments based on the
need for reserve to create positive growth, pointing
out that ‘longevity of collected emotion data can be
detrimental to a child’s growth and self-definition.’
This goes to the fundamentals of privacy (freedom to
explore assuming no harm to others), but also more
focused child rights to physical, mental, spiritual,
moral and social development. ‘These aspects of grow-
ing up really deserve to only be remembered by the
child and family and those who can make real meaning
out of it,’ Radesky argues, ‘Not in some database that
has pigeonholed the child as having some sort of emo-
tional characteristics for the purposes of marketing . . .’
(Interview, 2019).
Living with ontologically uncertain objects. Already intro-
duced in relation to unfairness and data longevity is
the issue of synthetic personalities that may simulate
empathy without meaningful testing or oversight.
Pasquale (2020) has taken issue with simulated empa-
thy due to potential for deceptive mimicry and the
imbalance of care between the child (who cares) and
the synthetic (that mimics). On this point, Minhas
remarks, ‘there’s a risk that emotional and
AI-powered toys could encourage a shift away from
the human touch’ (Interview, 2019). A key problem
for interviewees with a professional interest in children
is that the term ‘child’ represents a massive span of
intellectual and emotional abilities. Aligning with
Pasquale on mimicry, Radesky pointed out that
young children are ‘more likely to take things at face
value and are magical thinkers’ (Interview, 2019), thus
confusing appearance with reality. A consequence for
Radesky is that ‘they think it [the synthetic] should be
treated morally,’ which as Pasquale (2020) notes, risks
manipulation by manufacturers (and potentially third-
party companies).
Susceptibility of parents
The second main theme emerging from our study is
susceptibility of parents to having their own data illit-
eracy and emotions exploited. Certainly there are new
‘digital generations’ of parents (Colombo and
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Fortunati, 2011), but does this translate to an ability to
manage children’s data protection and interaction with
novel biometric and AI-based technologies?
Interviewed, Sonia Livingstone (LSE and director of
multiple global projects on child digital rights) pointed
to low parental literacy regarding personal data. She
observes, ‘As soon as [parents] start to think about it,
they get quite anxious about how the data is going to
be used, who has their child’s data, and whether it
might be used against them’ (Interview, 2020).
Parental susceptibility and their comprehension of per-
sonal data issues directly impacts children in multiple
ways. Discussing the example of a wearable that could
track child stress, Livingstone sees scope for vulnera-
bility through low data literacy: ‘The problem is the
parent might misunderstand and get it wrong’
(Interview, 2020).
Aligned with concern about data literacy is parental
emotional susceptibility. Radesky remarks that having
an infant child is a ‘huge growth period for parents’
and that [emotionally] ’you don’t stop developing just
when you reach the age of 18’ (Interview, 2019). With
adults still developing, learning to cope with being
parents, and children who may refuse to be calm or
sleep, this is not an ideal situation for making rational
decisions about privacy and data protection. Parental
susceptibility is that a technology may solve an imme-
diate short-term problem (such as calming a crying
child), but there is a long-term trade-off. This issue is
understood in privacy scholarship where, even with
sufficient information, people in general (never mind
frazzled parents) are likely to trade off long-term pri-
vacy for short-term benefits (Acquisti and Grossklags,
2005). Radesky worries that emotion-sensing may
come to be relied upon by stressed and worn-out
parents to understand why a child is behaving in a
given way. As a consequence, child-oriented emotional
AI will, for Radesky, be first marketed to parents to tell
them what their child is thinking and feeling when their
child is distressed, not sleeping, behaving in unusual
ways, or refuses to calm down.
Susceptibility also comes in the form of fear of fail-
ure (Leaver, 2017; Stark and Levy, 2018). For Radesky
this create an unethical business opportunity:
I worry that some simplistic technology is going to
jump in and say, “Hey, we’ll be able to predict your
child’s tantrums and stop them before they start” [and]
“We’ll be able to tell you what sort of things make your
child happy.
Reflecting on difficulties in parenting, she argues
parents are susceptible because they can be desperate.
The point about susceptibility through desperation is
amplified by Pamela Pavliscak (ChangeSciences and
Pratt Institute) who, despite misgivings about many
emotional AI applications, empathises with parent dif-
ficulties. As a user experience designer and consultant
on the topic, she observed, ‘all of the tech industry is
preying on the vulnerability of parents as well as chil-
dren,’ yet as a parent she admits, ‘I would [have been]
receptive to such products because I’m totally lazy and
I’m sleep deprived . . . thinking back to how tired I was,
I would totally go for that.’ Tentatively seeing benefit
in baby monitors that possess affect and emotion detec-
tion, Pavliscak comments, ‘That could be good’, but
(reminiscent of Pasquale’s (2020) concerns about
defending human expertise from AI) added that she is
concerned about a loss of empathetic skills ‘to under-
stand the difference between an angry cry and fussy
cry, because we just rely on the machine to tell us
what that is’ (Interview, 2019).
Immature signals. Interviewees both with and without
technical expertise in emotion-sensing see it as method-
ologically problematic. Radesky remarks, ‘With an
algorithm like deep learning, which is just trial-
and-error, emotions are not trial-and-error. They are
so much more complex than that and they represent a
deep network of different regulatory, physiological and
mental states within the brain’ (Interview, 2019). A key
problem is industrial overreliance on Ekman and
Friesen’s (1971) six basic emotions (Stark and Hoey,
2020). Fifty years later, even psychologists who support
face-based emotion research recognise complexity, this
taking the form of an expanded repertoire of emotions,
context specificity, multimodal sensing, situation
appraisals, expressive tendencies, temperament, signal
intent, subjective feeling states and multiple meanings
of expressions (Cowen et al., 2019).
On children specifically, Barrett et al. (2019) prob-
lematise face-based basic emotion systems due to their
lack of contextual awareness (e.g. who, why and where
a facial expression was made). They observed that
facial coding is especially poor with children, due to
their immaturity and lack of development in emoting.
There are also more subtle problems. Comparing
supervised and unsupervised machine learning about
emotion, Azari et al. (2020) find ‘above-chance classi-
fication accuracy in the supervised analyses . . . suggest-
ing that there is some information related to some of
the emotion category labels’ (p. 9). However, the unsu-
pervised learning stage did not replicate the emotion
data clusters that supervised leaning began with. The
significance is that machine learning in emotional AI
may discover a signal in data that is stipulated by a
system that seeks to stimulate an emotion (such as a
toy). Yet, when the stipulated signal is removed, ‘that
signal may not be sufficiently strong to be detected with
unsupervised analyses alongside other real world
6 Big Data & Society
variability in other features’ (2020: 10). In other words,
the creation of emotion labels imposes an unnatural (or
at least contingent) vantage point on the world, where
one may find what one wishes to see. These emotion
labels are problematic because of their contextual, cul-
tural and ethnocentric nature. This is a well-rehearsed
argument in social constructionist accounts of emo-
tions (McStay, 2018), but through empirical work test-
ing supervised and unsupervised machine learning,
Azari et al. (2020: 10) conclude that ‘emotion catego-
ries are better thought of as populations of highly var-
iable, context-specific instances.’ This leads them to
challenge predetermined labels in building supervised
classifiers in emotional AI systems.
The lack of high quality training data for analysing
emotion expressions and affect was raised by multiple
interviewees. Minhas observed ‘a lot of the training
data that’s out there is still at a very early stage, it’s
kind of academic research’ (Interview, 2019). As to
achieving high confidence in automated emotion detec-
tion, Minhas adds, ‘I think it will be multimodal’ –
necessitating extra signals and data sources to triangu-
late and identify a child’s state. Although this may
improve accuracy, it perforce increases surveillance
breadth (McStay and Urquhart, 2019). As a conse-
quence, Minhas adds, ‘And certainly as a business,
our ethos would probably steer us away from . . . build-
ing our technology into objects where the main recipi-
ents of which would be children’. This takes us beyond
the scope of this article, but it worth noting that emo-
tional AI companies operating in public spaces (such
as retail, in the case of Sensing-Feeling) will inevitably
collect data about children, even if they are not the
main target.
Guarded interest
No interviewee expressed unreserved support for toys
that pertain to sense emotion, but some did express
guarded interest, our study’s third main theme.
Interest clustered around child health, wellbeing,
safety and creativity. In academic writing,
Livingstone (2009, 2018) tries to re-balance alarmism
with the opportunities of internet use. It was notable
then that, in interview, when asked about emotoys and
emotional AI in child-focused devices she says:
So, partly, I’m with that large proportion of the general
public that just wants to say, “Stop!” But I can see
many incredibly well-meaning claims from decent
organizations about how this can be used to do good.
So the health industry or the health sector is probably
the best case of that. And I think this is . . . the debate
to be had. We have to decide what is going to benefit
children. (Interview, 2020)
For Livingstone, this debate is informed by the logics
of trade-offs: ‘There’s all kinds of interesting trade-offs,
aren’t there, in separating whose data is being collected,
and who is going to benefit from this data collection?’
On benefit, while Golin is sceptical on who is directing,
controlling and commercially benefitting from the play
activity, he acknowledges that a positive development
in smart toys conceivably could be ‘when they allow
children to exercise their creativity’ (Interview, 2019).
However, with a background in technology design,
Pavliscak was sceptical of creativity in emotoys, opining
that adult toymakers fundamentally misunderstand the
nature of child play. This is supported in wider research
on smart toys, with Grimes (2015) and Marsh (2017)
pointing to child frustration with the limitations and
lack of creativity afforded by smart toys, and a need
to be able to transgress the rules of the smart toy.
Pavliscak comments that children are unlikely to ask,
‘“Oh, Barbie, please counsel me on what to wear”’ but
observes ‘they’re going to cut off all of her hair and rip
off a leg.’ Pavliscak adds, ‘I’m really hard pressed to see
anything in the past 30 years of electronic toys that
really held any interest, and emotion detection doesn’t
promise much more’ (Interview, 2019).
Eva Lievens, a European child law expert and smart
toy researcher is less negative about smart and emo-
toys: ‘Some of these toys are really, really entertaining
and really interesting for children; sometimes educa-
tional’ (Interview, 2019). Lievens adds that the value
of emotoys depends on their purpose: ‘I could imagine
that, for instance, very sick children who are in hospital
and who are lonely, that maybe such kind of toys can
enhance their wellbeing.’ Also seeing potential for pos-
itive uses, Amelia Vance (Future of Privacy Forum)
described tests with CogniToys’s conversational toy
Dino (2015) that uses IBM Watson technology to inter-
act with children. She sees potential benefits, including
‘helping kids self-regulate their emotions, helping them
figure out how to calm down and really visualise.’
Although recognising scope for privacy abuse and the
need for parental consent, Vance suggests that toys
such as Dino might help ‘to deal with a student who
has a problem with self-regulation in elementary
school’ (Interview, 2019). This purpose-based justifica-
tion connects with Art. 3 of the United Nations
Convention on the Rights of the Child (UNCRC)
that states ‘the best interests of the child shall be a
primary consideration’. Although privacy plays a role
in the UNCRC (Art. 16), the Convention is broader in
scope. Toy researcher and child rights specialist,
Ingrida Milkaite, echoes this: ‘I think it depends very
much on whether an actor is trying to create things in
the best interest of the child for the wellbeing of the
child’ (Interview, 2019). Similarly, for Verdoodt, best
interest is about scope and purpose restrictions, urging
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emotoys designers to: ‘[. . .] not go and sell or commer-
cialise the data that you are collecting for this purpose’
and ‘to try to keep it as limited as possible’ (Interview,
2019).
Need for good governance
European legal experts were cautious and critical, but
did not reject the premise of emotoys. They did however
insist on the need for good governance, our study’s fourth
main theme. Cautious interest for Valerie Verdoordt (a
child rights and data protection law researcher from
LSE) took the form of a child’s right to participate in
the digital environment, ‘perhaps with these toys’
(Interview, 2019). Verdoordt’s point aligns with the
Council of Europe (2016) that recognises scope for
harm in the digital environment, yet simultaneously pro-
motes healthy access to it. The law, then, has enabling as
well as restricting dimensions; although Verdoordt (in
line with Art 12. of the UNCRC that promotes expres-
sion of views that affect the child) states
if a toy company [were to] develop such an IoT
[Internet of Things] toy . . . what they should really
do is also listen to children during the development
phase [. . .] Children also have “a right to be heard”
because it is in ‘the best interest principle of the child.
(Council of Europe, 2016)
The European Union’s General Data Protection
Regulation (GDPR) makes no reference whatsoever
to emotions. Similarly, a proposal for the ePrivacy reg-
ulation rarely mentions emotions. Only recitals 2 and
20 of the ePrivacy preamble mention emotions
although, importantly, recital 2 defines them as
highly sensitive. In context of medical conditions,
sexual preferences and political views, the proposed
ePrivacy directive says that unwanted disclosure of
data about emotions could result in personal and
social harm, economic loss or embarrassment
(European Commission, 2020). However, while present
in the recitals, emotions do not appear in the articles of
the proposed ePrivacy directive. Further, for all legal
experts, children were seen to be low on the list of pri-
orities for the GDPR, although they saw scope for
potential in the legislation that could be realised
though guidance from the European Data Protection
Board (the EU body in charge of application of the
GDPR).
Governance of emotional AI (and emotoys) is further
complicated by GDPR being only one part of a wider
governance system, especially as it overlaps with consumer
protection. Damian Clifford (legal specialist in emotional
AI) raised the issue of consent, which the GDPR requires
to be freely given (Art. 7). Clifford is sceptical that consent
to data processing is ‘freely given’ and has reservations
about whether access to emotoys should be conditional
upon consent. In addition to well-known problems of
complex language and the length of time it takes to read
privacy notices (Cranor et al., 2014), a more unique prob-
lem is that emotional AI may be integrated into a given
service. This leads Clifford to suggest that ’the boundaries
between processing that is necessary for the provision of
the service might come under something like a contract as
grounds for processing as opposed to consent.’
In addition to minimal attention to emotion and
consent, extra-territoriality was also raised by legal
experts. The GDPR applies beyond the territorial
boundaries of the EU for data processing activities. It
applies for (1) offering of goods or services to data
subjects situated in the EU (not just EU citizens); (2)
monitoring the behaviour of such data subjects, where
data potentially leaves the EU to be processed
(Cremona and Scott, 2019). Extra-territoriality
emerged as a concern due to the international nature
of the emotoys market and different data protection
standards around the world. European law and gover-
nance specialists noted that early connected and smart
toys were (and still are) often produced in the US or in
China, with child rights specialist Eva Lievens express-
ing concern about entrance into the EU market of toys
that ‘do not have the same data protection require-
ments as in the EU’ (Interview, 2019).
Special protections for emotion data? In addition to unique
provision for children, we were also interested in
whether there should be special protections for data
about emotion. McStay (2016, 2018) has argued for a
class of privacy protection based on intimacy, but there
is a good case to be made that existing provisions for
biometrics and personal data are sufficient. Interviewees
from a legal background agreed that emotion is of
innate interest. However, they did not agree that special
legal provisions are needed, although certain practices
might need further restrictions. Asked whether more leg-
islation is required, Clifford responded, ‘the more [laws]
we adopt the more it seems to contradict what we’ve
got. . .’ Rather: ‘I think what we need at the moment is
some enforcement’ (Interview, 2019). Clifford also sees
need for greater regulatory clarity on whether data
about human emotion is personal data or sensitive per-
sonal data, where the boundaries lie, and at what point
data about emotion fits into one category or the other.
Eva Lievens similarly sees the intrinsic value in emotion,
noting that emotion is inherent to a person’s identity,
personality and to human intimacy. She adds that the
goal of data protection regulation is not only to realise
the right to data protection, but that it is also closely
linked to privacy rights. Yet, on sensitive data, she
observes that ‘there is already some kind of specific
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protection in relation to biometric data,’ meaning no
extra law is required (Interview, 2019).
Timing and consent. The GDPR provides for six legal
bases that allow personal data to be processed: consent,
contractual obligations, legal obligations, vital inter-
ests, public interest and legitimate interests (Art. 6). It
is thus conceivable that children’s emotional data could
be processed without gaining consent. However,
Verdoodt argued that ‘consent appears to be the only
legal basis,’ adding
as a company, if you opt for the ground of legitimate
interest, you have to balance your legitimate interests
with the data subject rights, with the rights of the data
subject and the interests of the data subject. In this
balancing test, the interests of children will be stronger
or taken more into account than adult data subjects. So
I think it will be difficult to use this as ground for
processing. (Interview, 2019)
If consent is to be the primary basis by which personal
data may be processed and if consent is to be given by
the child, at what age should children be able to give
consent? The GDPR sets a child’s age of consent at
16 years old but allows Member States to lower this
threshold to 13. Eva Lievens and Ingrida Milkaite
note the historical lack of justification by States for
their choices. Lievens says, in some cases
it’s a reference to national contract law or law on
capacities of children, or it is a reference to the US
Children’s Online Privacy Protection Act (COPPA),
or it is a reference to, “Oh well, our neighbouring coun-
try is using that age.” But it’s almost never develop-
mentally justified reasoning on why a child is consid-
ered competent to give consent from a certain age
(Interview, 2019).
Thus, despite the effort of GDPR to harmonise data
protection across Member States, provision of protec-
tion for children varies without scientific foundation.
Interviewees with legal expertise were also asked
when the process of obtaining consent should begin.
As will be developed in discussion of the parental
survey below, this temporal question is important.
Should it be in-store before purchase, on the box,
inside the box, on a website, or in an app? Eva
Lievens says, ‘I think this is really a point of attention
for toy manufacturers’, suggesting toy boxes should
indicate that data about child emotion will be collected
by the toys (Interview, 2019). Stephen Balkam (US-
based Family Online Safety Institute) similarly says,
‘I would love to see more in the way of decorations
on the front of a box . . . that says “Hey, parents!
This is what we do with the data” blah blah blah.
Not a 14-page privacy policy. . .’ (Interview, 2019).
Josh Golin, speaking of COPPA and the US context,
is also clear on this:
I do think efforts in really stark and clear language that
talk about what [devices] collect and what’s happening
with the information at point-of-sale is really impor-
tant because I don’t believe that it’s really informed
consent once you get to point of downloading the
app and you’ve already got this product that your
child is excited about (Interview, 2019)
Further ‘obviously the industry would fight that tooth
and nail because it would probably really kill sales if
you picked up a toy and it said, “Warning, anything
you say to this doll might be listened to by employees
of Mattel”’ (Interview, 2019). Yet, reflecting on the
consent process in the EU (under GDPR, recital 32
and Art. 7), Verdoodt questioned the feasibility of the
consent process beginning in-store: ‘that’s an interest-
ing idea, but I’m not sure if that’s possible. If you have
to give all of the information that normally you’re
required to give, it will probably take a lot of time in
the stores’ (Interview, 2019).
Survey findings: Parental perspectives
Having established four primary themes from the inter-
views (generational unfairness, susceptibility of
parents, guarded interest and the need for good gover-
nance), we next sought survey-based insights from
parents regarding the acceptability of emotoys and
use of emotional AI in child-focused technologies,
and by what terms use of these intimate technologies
in toys should be governed. (See Table 2 for questions
and findings.)
Q1 asks: ‘How comfortable are you with the idea of
Internet-connected toys for children that process data
about a child’s emotions?’ Parents were not given
extended descriptions of the technology, but were in
effect asked to consider the principle of emotoys. We
were especially interested in creepiness (McStay, 2018;
Tene and Polonetsky, 2014), parental alarm and com-
fort with new technology (Livingstone, 2009). Parents
display neither high comfort nor very low comfort,
with 48% overall registering as ‘Uncomfortable’
(versus 30% overall as ‘Comfortable’). This suggests
that while parents are clearly not comfortable with
the idea of these technologies for a variety of reasons
(some unpacked below in answers to other questions),
parental alarm was not a leading sentiment.
Q2 asked parents:
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Table 2. Parental perceptions of child-focused emotional AI.
Question Pre-defined answers Percentile
Q1. How comfortable are you with the idea of Internet-connected









Q2. How comfortable would you feel giving your child an internet-
connected wristwatch or wearable device that reports insights on
their emotional state back to you, such as whether they are happy,
stressed, angry or sad? The device would provide both daily
information and a longer-term record of their emotional state over









Q3. Thinking about a wearable device for your children that reports insights on their emotional state back to you, to what extent do
you agree or disagree with the following statements with regards to such a device?
Statement about wearable for child Agreement type Percentile
Q3.1 It would help me with my parenting Strongly agree 13
Tend to agree 30
Neither agree or disagree 27
Tend to disagree 19
Strongly disagree 10
Don’t know 2
Q3.2 It is intrusive Strongly agree 24
Tend to agree 35
Neither agree or disagree 26
Tend to disagree 11
Strongly disagree 3
Don’t know 1
Q3.3 I don’t know what I’d do with the information Strongly agree 11
Tend to agree 31
Neither agree or disagree 30
Tend to disagree 20
Strongly disagree 6
Don’t know 2
Q3.4 I would be concerned who has access to the data Strongly agree 51
Tend to agree 29
Neither agree or disagree 11
Tend to disagree 6
Strongly disagree 2
Don’t know 1
Q3.5 It would help me develop a stronger bond with my children and
understand them better
Strongly agree 13
Tend to agree 30
Neither agree or disagree 26
Tend to disagree 18
Strongly disagree 12
Don’t know 2
Q4. How much do you agree or disagree with the following state-
ment: “Companies that create toys which record and make use
of data about children’s emotions and feelings (from facial expres-
sions, voices, heart rates and other data about the body) have a
duty to report to appropriate authorities if they think that a child
might be being abused, self-harming or otherwise highly
distressed?”
Strongly agree 29
Tend to agree 25
Neither agree or disagree 21
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Table 2. Continued.
Question Pre-defined answers Percentile
Q5. Emotion-sensing toys can use a range of sensors, cameras and microphones. Different manufacturers may have different ways of
detecting and understanding children’s emotions.Please rank in order of importance, where 1 is the most important and 7 is the
least important, the means by which parents should be informed of the types and methods of data collection for these toys.
Information type Importance scale (1–7) Percentile





















Terms and conditions shown on a phone or computer screen that I








Periodic notifications on my phone or other device reminding me that

















A cartoon or video shown on a phone or computer screen that tells
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How comfortable would you feel giving your child an
internet-connected wristwatch or wearable device that
reports insights on their emotional state back to you,
such as whether they are happy, stressed, angry or sad?
The device would provide both daily information and a
longer-term record of their emotional state over a
period of time.
The highest response is ‘Fairly comfortable’ at 30%,
although this is followed by ‘Fairly uncomfortable’ as
the second highest response (25%). Overall, those reg-
istering as ‘Uncomfortable’ were 37% versus
‘Comfortable’ at 43%. Again, the lack of polarisation
of positive or negative reaction is notable. While we
surveyed people who identify as men as well as
women equally, we note Lupton and Pederson’s
(2016a) observations about women’s appetite for track-
ing technologies and self-monitoring of their bodies,
foetuses and infants (including app-based mood track-
ers). More work is required on this tentative comfort,
but we speculate that one reason for this is familiarity
with personal biometric technologies.
Q3 asked parents to consider wearable devices for
children that reports insights on a child’s emotional
state back to parents. A key finding in Q3.1 is that
43% agree that an emotion sensing wearable would
help respondents with their parenting, while 29% dis-
agreed. These findings should be treated cautiously
since the technologies were not explained, nor was
the questionable effectiveness of using biometrics to
infer emotion (Azari et al., 2020; Barrett et al., 2019;
McStay, 2018). Nevertheless, the idea that these tech-
nologies could be a benefit to parenting was not dis-
missed. Follow-up work is required to explore this, but
our initial reactions connect with Lupton and
Pederson’s (2016a) aforementioned interest in tracking
technologies, reassurance through quantification, and
Leaver’s (2017) observation that not using intimate sur-
veillance has scope to be seen as a failure of parenting.
From the survey we cannot conclude parental motives
for interest in emotion-sensing wearables, but desire for
reassurance seem sensible. We do conclude however
that, in relation to governance and policy, relevant reg-
ulators should consider failure and guilt-based sales
tactics in surveillance technologies (emotion-based or
otherwise) as problematic.
Q3.2 finds that 59% of parents agreed that a child-
oriented wearable that tracks emotion is intrusive,
although this too should be seen in light of the finding
that parents broadly think it would help them with
their parenting. Again, this gives support for Leaver’s
(2017) point about intimate surveillance and that
parents are aware of being potentially invasive, yet
this is justified on grounds of what is understood as
‘good parenting’. We agree with parents, that it is
intrusive, but add that if emotion trackers are used to
assist with mental and emotional wellbeing (such as
combatting child anxiety), it is questionable whether
wrist-based surveillance devices will help given privacy
concerns.
Q3.3 raises an apparent paradox: it finds that
despite the perceived potential to help with parenting
established in Q3.1, 42% in Q3.3 ‘strongly’ or ‘tended’
to agree that they did not know what they would do
with information about their children’s emotions.
Further qualitative work will help resolve this, but we
think it is partially explained by: (1) longstanding
acculturation of digital media into parenting and (2)
lack of familiarity with devices that collect data about
emotions. The question becomes one of what would
social adoption look like as parents become more
familiar with them and what conventions would be
formed around the data from emotion-based devices?
As Lupton and Pederson (2016b) have explored, it is
useful to take lessons from acculturation processes in
digital media, such as asynchronous messaging (like
texting and emoji), real-time more intimate communi-
cation (phone) and video calls (to see visual images of
their children as they chat). Indeed, this care for well-
being from a distance helps explain parental interest in
emotion trackers even if parents are not yet clear on
what they would do with the data. Longhurst (2016)
grants a glimpse of the nature of acculturalisation as
she discusses the mediation of emotion in hybrid terms
as the organic and inorganic comingle through commu-
nication technologies. McLuhanite in its vision of an
extended sensorium (McLuhan and Fiore, 1967), the
appeal is that emotion-based devices may promise
ambient awareness of wellbeing, even if it is not clear
to parents what they would do with that information.
It will be interesting to see how social adoption and the
technologies develop, especially in light of: (1)
Longhurst’s argument that mothers perform the major-
ity of emotional labour; (2) that emotion in relation-
ships has long been mediated; and (3) that mediation
enriches inter-connections. For example, wearable
manufacturers continue research into languages of
haptic communication (McStay, 2018), which provides
not only for communication, but touch-based intimacy
from afar. We look forward to close-up study of these
technologies in lived contexts, just as social media and
messaging are prevalent today. This will be to under-
stand the child-focused emotional AI not only in terms
of unfairness and the concerns posed in this article, but
acculturalisation among parents and children.
Q3.4 is about levels of concern over who would
access data about the child. Eighty per cent of parents
agreed that they would be concerned about who has
access to the data, with only 8% disagreeing. Despite
relatively extensive literature pointing to low level of
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parental concern about data privacy and children
(Lupton and Pederson, 2016b), we see parallel with
Livingstone et al.’s (2018) finding that while parents
do adopt new technologies they are simultaneously
concerned about privacy. This seeming contradiction
is apparent in Q3.5 as, again, it shows that despite
strong privacy concerns, parents think there is in prin-
ciple potential for these technologies to help develop
stronger bonds with their children and understand
them better (43% agree, with 30% disagreeing with
this premise). Collectively, the answers to Q3 indicate
ambivalence in that parents might be interested in such
devices for a variety of reasons, but they have clear
privacy and security concerns about who might be
able to access data about children.
Q4 was interested in reactions to the proposition
that toy companies might have a duty to report to
appropriate authorities if systems flag that a child
might be being abused, self-harming or otherwise
highly distressed. The question was motivated by: (1)
an extension of research focus from parental to insti-
tutional surveillance; (2) the thorny ethics of child pro-
tection and intervention (Hall et al., 2016); and (3)
concern from the technology ethics field on the need
to defend human expertise from technophilic AI claims
(Pasquale, 2020). Overall, 54% agree with the premise
versus 16% who did not. The point about human
expertise is vital, especially given that emotion-
sensing is a deeply problematic method (Barrett et al.,
2019; McStay, 2018). As discussed above in the inter-
view section on immature signals, Azari et al.’s (2020)
findings about over-reliance on basic, folk and ethno-
centrically specific categories of emotion are central
because they confirm that emotion labels are social
and contingent. Applied to our question of sensing
whether a child might be being abused, self-harming
or otherwise highly distressed, the scope for misunder-
standing in emotional AI is profoundly problematic
due to scope for false positives (and negatives) in the
most sensitive of circumstances (child abuse).
Given longstanding concern about privacy and con-
sent notification (Cranor et al., 2014), Q5 was interest-
ed in the means by which parents should be informed
of the types and methods of data collection for these
toys. Options given were: in-store signage; on the box
packaging; on an app after unboxing; on a range of
networked devices that must be shown before the toy
will work; through periodic notifications reminding
parents that data about their child is being collected;
notification when a new type of data is being collected;
and cartoons or a video that tell parents what data is
being collected and how. Parents did not express strong
preference for any option and it is possible that respon-
dent fatigue may have occurred. There are however
some clear insights: Q5.1 finds that parents are not
keen on in-store signage as a means informing them
about what data is collected, but on-the-box packaging
received a much better response in Q5.2 with 30%
voting for this as the most important means. Q5.4
shows that parents were also positive about an
approach whereby a device will not function until
terms and conditions have been read. Again, given
longstanding observations about the lack of attention
paid to terms and conditions of service, this is worthy
of follow-up assessment to further scrutinise the
finding.
The finding of parental preference for on-the-box
packaging may not be a scintillating insight, but it is
very practical. It also resonates with the statement from
the UK Information Commissioner’s Office that cus-
tomers should be able to view privacy information,
terms and conditions of use and other relevant infor-
mation online without having to purchase and set up
the device first, meaning customers can make informed
decisions about whether to buy the device in the first
place (ICO, 2020). The time-based dimension is impor-
tant because it answers a problem in data protection
provision and, with appropriate easy-to-digest infor-
mation on the box, begins the informed consent pro-
cess before the item has been bought. In relation to
toys, it also helps address problematic consent stipula-
tions in GDPR: that consent should be given when a
person provides data to a controller and at the time
when personal data are obtained (Art. 13).
Conclusions
Emotional AI is the use of affective computing and
artificial intelligence techniques to try to sense, learn
about, and interact with human emotional life. This
article has explored usage in toys (emotoys) and related
child-focused objects (such as wearables that pertain to
track wellbeing). To explore the significance of these in
relation to ethics, governance and data protection, the
article made use of expert interviews and a UK nation-
al survey of parents. The interview stage raised diverse
concerns about generational unfairness. Having digital
origins in ‘sharenting’ and exploitation of children’s
digital footprints, generational unfairness itself is not
a new idea. Yet, unfairness and injustices through the
datafication of emotional life introduce new concerns
and questions. Interviewees opined that adults are
doing a disservice to children, that they are not envis-
aging consequences and that they are creating gross
power imbalances between children and corporations.
Unfairness through imbalances took a range of forms,
including manipulation of child vulnerability, that
parts of childhood should remain in the past, unwanted
labelling of behaviour, the need to try-for-size adult
concepts like sexuality without a corporate data gaze,
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and socially unhealthy corporate strategic interest in
the construction of synthetic behaviours.
Interviewees also saw parents as vulnerable, espe-
cially in relation to data literacy, inexperience of raising
children, fatigue, fear of failure, concern about the loss
of human skill in parenting and the outsourcing of
these skills to questionable technologies. Interviewees
flagged problems with methods behind these technolo-
gies, a point this article bolstered with discussion of
contextual, cultural, ethnocentric and labelling techni-
ques in machine supervised learning. Methods aside,
interviewees saw scope for good in child-focused emo-
tional AI but insisted that it must be used in the best
interests of the child. Governance was shown to be
problematic, with all recognising that laws remain lim-
ited for children and questions of datafied emotion.
However, expert interviewees did not recommend new
law, but better enforcement of existing law. Regarding
toys and other emo-objects themselves, consent was
the preferred legal basis for personal data to be
processed.
The survey stage generated ambivalent responses.
Parents were concerned about privacy, yet also saw
merit in emotion-enabled devices. Leaver’s (2017)
work on parents and intimate surveillance provides a
useful prism in that it recognises the affective context of
parenting, fear of failure, inherent surveillance in par-
enting and longstanding datafication in parenting (such
as pregnancy apps and sensors in infant cots). What
might be seen as contradictory findings – such as
broad agreement that emotion sensing wearables
could help with parenting, but that parents did not
know what they would do with this information
about their children’s emotions – are to an extent
resolved by seeing that parents want to do the right
thing. With very high concern for privacy added,
parents are pulled in multiple directions. We suggest
that the survey results reflect the technology,
parenting and governance landscape well. Given that
parenting is inherently about care, communication,
wellbeing, emotion, oversight, modulation of control,
interest in new tools to help with parenting, and that
parents are exploring the mediation of these in a highly
imperfect governance context, the results make
sense. We recommend close regulatory attention to
these technologies due to questionable effectiveness,
potential trading of long-term privacy for short-term
benefits, and the conceivable severity of outcomes
resulting from the processing and sharing of child
data (we have the finding on potential child abuse in
mind).
As a practical final point, if these technologies are to
be deployed at scale, we draw on findings from the
expert interviews and the parental survey to urge on-
box notification for emotoys. Further, on how to
advance child and parental data literacy (flagged at
the interview stage), the popularity of unboxing
videos with children (Ofcom, 2019) should not be
missed: an age-appropriate communications strategy
featuring prominent YouTubers to enhance data liter-
acy regarding emotoys and related toys might also be
considered.
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